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ABSTRACT 
For those EU airports whose catchment area is sparsely populated, 
it may be difficult to achieve the necessary air traffic volume that generates 
sufficient revenues to cover operating losses. Public financial support is 
often crucial to keep these airports operating, though it may be considered 
incompatible State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU.  
To have such public aid cleared by the European Commission, two 
options are open to national authorities. Either they invoke the 
compatibility conditions for operating aid to airports recently introduced 
by the Commission’s 2014 Aviation Guidelines on state aid to airports and 
airliners or they claim that the aided airports constitute SGEI and that 
compensation granted to airports for the provision of such services meet 
the compatibility conditions, laid down by the 2011 SGEI Decision or the 
SGEI Framework adopted by the Commission.  
The article deals with the second option based on the State aid rules 
for SGEI. It delves into how the Commission has applied these rules in 
the aviation sector, looking in particular at the cases of Kalmar Airport, 
Sundsvall Timra Airport, Skelleftea Airport. These three Swedish State aid 
airport cases are noteworthy because they illustrate what the Commission 
expects from national authorities to demonstrate that airport aid complies 
with the SGEI rules. Arguably, on applying the criteria laid down by the 
2014 Aviation Guidelines, the Commission has crafted a two-limb test for 
the qualification of airports as SGEI, revolving around the isolation 
condition and the market failure condition. After reviewing the 
Commission’s decisional practice on the administration of this test, it can 
be submitted that small airports located in scarcely inhabited areas 
struggling to make profits are more likely to be considered by the 
Commission as SGEI. 
National authorities should bear this point in mind either when 
drafting public service compensation arrangements for airports or when 
defending the Commission’s objection that such arrangements constitute 
incompatible state aid in the context of Article 107 TFEU enquiries. 
National authorities should also make sure that the entrustment acts 
satisfy the formal and substantive requirements included in the 
compatibility conditions laid down by the Commission’s 2011 SGEI 
Decision and SGEI Framework.  A shoddy compliance is likely to result 
in the Commission finding that the national measures under scrutiny are 
outside the safe harbours provided by the 2011 SGEI Decision and SGEI 
Framework with the ensuing risk that the compensation may be viewed 
by the Commission as incompatible State aid. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Regional airports are sometimes located in sparsely populated areas 
and achieve small traffic figures. Unsurprisingly, they are likely to struggle 
to generate enough revenues to cover their operating losses and earn a 
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profit. Support through public funds is then often crucial to keep these 
airports opened, but it may trigger the regulatory intervention of the 
European Commission to ascertain whether this kind of support 
constitute state aid under Article 107(1) TFEU.  
European Commission’s 2014 Aviation Guidelines indicate that, 
under certain conditions, the management and running of an airport can 
be considered as services of general economic interest (hereinafter 
SGEI)1. When an airport qualifies for SGEI, it it may fall within the scope 
of application of the SGEI exception in Article 106(2) TFEU2. As a result, 
public financial sustain granted to such an airport can be found to be 
compatible with the internal market on the basis of Article 106(2) TFEU. 
To clarify under which conditions this exception applies, the Commission 
has adopted the so-called SGEI package to enact new State aid rules for 
SGEI3. The SGEI package includes hard-law and soft-law instruments 
                                                            
1 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on State aid to airports and airliners, 
OJEU 2014 C99/3, Point 72 that reads that: ‘As far as airports are concerned, the 
Commission considers that it is possible for the overall management of an airport, in 
well-justified cases, to be considered an SGEI. In the light of the principles outlined in 
point 69, the Commission considers that this can only be the case if part of the area 
potentially served by the airport would, without the airport, be isolated from the rest of 
the Union to an extent that would prejudice its social and economic development. Such 
an assessment should take due account of other modes of transport, and in particular of 
high-speed rail services or maritime links served by ferries. In such cases, public 
authorities may impose a public service obligation on an airport to ensure that the airport 
remains open to commercial traffic. The Commission notes that certain airports have an 
important role to play in terms of regional connectivity of isolated, remote or peripheral 
regions of the Union. Such a situation may, in particular, occur in respect of the 
outermost regions, as well as islands or other areas of the Union. Subject to a case-by-
case assessment and depending on the particular characteristics of each airport and the 
region which it serves, it may be justified to define SGEI obligations in those airports’. 
2  Article 106(2) TFEU lays down that: ‘Undertakings entrusted with the operation of 
services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing 
monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to the rules 
on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the 
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development 
of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of 
the Union’. 
3 Nicola Pesaresi, Adinda Sinnaeve, Valérie Guigue-Koeppen, Joachim Wiemann, 
Madalina Radulescu, ‘The New State Aid Rules for Services of General Economic 
Interest (SGEI): The Commission Decision and the Framework of 20 December 2011, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2012_1_11_en.pdf, last 
visited 5 September 2018. 
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and namely the SGEI Communication4, the 2011 SGEI Decision5, the 
2011 SGEI Framework6 and the De Minimis Regulation7. Member States 
can defend the Commission’s objections that airport aid constitutes 
incompatible State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU by invoking the rules 
in the SGEI package. By the same token, Member States can also forestall 
such objections by shaping financial aid packages for airports in 
accordance with the State aid rules for SGEI. Reliance on these rules, 
which in the context of this article will be labelled as the SGEI strategy, 
may be an effective way for public authorities to financially support loss-
making airports that play a relevant role for local communities.  
Since the enactment of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines, the European 
Commission has approved public service compensation for airports on 
the basis of the SGEI exception in the Swedish cases of Kalmar Airport8, 
Sundsvall Timra Airport9, Skelleftea Airport10. These decisions will be referred 
throughout this article as the Swedish airports State aid cases. The 
Commission considered the legality of airport aid in the form of public 
service compensation in a further case concerning a Swedish airport, 
Västeras Airport11. However, public aid in this case was approved on the 
                                                            
4 Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State 
aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic 
interest, OJEU 2012, C 8/4, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012XC0111(02)&from=EN, visited 5 
September 2017.  
5 Commission Decision of 20 December on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service 
compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services 
of general economic interest, OJEU 2012, L7/3, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012D0021&from=EN, 
visited 5 September 2017. 
6 Communication from Commission, European Union Framework for State aid in the 
form of public service compensation , OJEU 2012 C8/15, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012XC0111(03)&from=EN, visited 5 
September 2017. 
7 Commission Regulation no. 360/2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to 
undertakings providing services of general economic interest, OJEU 2012 L 114/8, 
available, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012 
R0360&from=EN, visited 5 September 2017. 
8 Commission Decision of 2 December 2016, Case SA.43964 – Kalmar Öland Airport-
entrustment of a Service of General Economic Interest, C(2016) 7781 final. 
9 Commission Decision of 19 January 2016, Case SA.38892- Sundsvall Timra Airport-
entrustment of a Service of General Economic Interest, C(2016) 133 final. 
10 Commission Decision of 19 January 2016, Case SA.38757-Skelleftea Airport-.entrustment 
of a Service of General Economic Interest, C(2016) final. 
11 Commission Decision of 1 October 2014, Case SA.18857, Alleged aid to Västeras Airport 
and Ryanair Ltd, Case SA.18857. 
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basis of the compatibility conditions in the 2014 Aviation Guidelines. 
Incidentally, the SGEI exception was accepted by the Commission also in 
Angoulême Airport12 and Inverness Airport13,  which were determined before 
and after the Swedish airports State aid cases, respectively.  
Whether and when, in the decisional practice of the Commission, 
financial aid granted to airports entrusted with public tasks can be 
considered as a compensation for SGEI is the issue addressed by this 
article. Compensation granted to airports for performing public service 
obligation (PSO) does not constitute state aid if it satisfies the four 
cumulative conditions set out in the Altmark doctrine14. The focus of this 
article is, however, on the different scenario where public aid does not 
meet the requirements for the application of the Altmark doctrine and its 
legality is assessed on the basis of the State aid rules for SGEI. More 
precisely, this article examines the findings of the Commission in the 
Swedish airports State aid cases. These cases well illustrate the decisional 
practice developed by the Commission for the application of the State aid 
rules for SGEI in the aviation sector given that in these cases the SGEI 
strategy was the main defensive argument invoked by the national 
authorities. In that regard, the article gives readers an insight into which 
facts and circumstances public authorities have to submit in support for 
their SGEI-related claims to have the airport aid cleared by the 
Commission. 
The remaining structure of the article is as follows. First, the article 
introduces readers to the relevant EU regulatory framework for airport aid 
in the form of public service compensation. Second, the article describes 
the facts of the Kalmar Airport, Sundsvall Timra Airport, Skelleftea Airport, 
distinguishing them from those in Västeras Airport. Third and fourth, the 
article considers how the Commission administered the Altmark test and 
applied the State aid rules for SGEI to the above Swedish airports State 
aid cases. Lastly, the article draws some conclusions. 
2. THE RELEVANT EU REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPENSATION TO AIRPORTS  
Member States planning to give financial support to regional 
airports, which are ailing because revenues are lower than expenses, can 
argue that such financial sustain covers the operating losses of the 
beneficiary and then invoke the compatibility conditions for operating aid 
set out in the 2014 Aviation Guidelines15. When these public aid measures 
meet the above compatibility conditions they are approved by the 
                                                            
12 European Commission, Decision of 23 July 2014 (SA.33963) concerning Aéroport 
d'Angoulême.  
13 Europan Commission, Decision of 18 July 2017 (SA.45692) concerning Airport of Inverness.  
14 European Court of Justice, Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH,Regierungspräsidium 
Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, [2003] ECR I-7747. 
15 Points 112-137 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines, above note n. 1. 
NJCL 2017/2 
 
215 
Commission. It should be borne in mind, however, that the compatibility 
conditions for operating aid to airports will be available only throughout 
the 10-year transitional period, which started on the date of the enactment 
of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines16. 
Alternatively, public authorities can rely on the SGEI strategy, 
arguing that the PSO imposed on airports have the nature of an SGEI. As 
said above, Point 72 of the 2014 Guidelines expressly says that in well-
justified cases the overall management of an airport can be considered as 
SGEI. It is submitted that what differentiate SGEI from PSO is a quid 
plus,17 as reflected by the fact that SGEI have special characteristics if 
compared to other economic activities. Typically, the notion of SGEI 
comprises services addressed to citizens or are supplied in the interest of 
society as a whole. Such services are not and cannot be satisfactorily 
provided by the market ‘under conditions such as price, objective quality 
characteristics and access to the service consistent with the public interest, 
as defined by the State’.18 The power to determine which public tasks 
constitute SGEI and sett the compensation to which the services suppliers 
are entitled is within the competences of the Member States. These 
powers, however, are not unfettered as Member States have to exercise 
them in compliance with the EU relevant provisions and case law. The 
measures enacted by Member States are subject to the scrutiny of the 
Commission that has to check whether the former have made no manifest 
errors in the definition of SGEI19.   
2.1. THE ALTMARK DOCTRINE  
The underpinning for the Altmark doctrine is that the public service 
compensation awarded to the airport is not state aid due to the lack of an 
economic advantage for the recipient. For Article 107(1) TFEU to apply, 
several cumulative conditions must be fulfilled by the national measures 
alleged to constitute state aid, among which the award of an economic 
                                                            
16 Point 112 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines, above note n. 1.  
17 Caroline Wehlander, ‘Services of General Economic Interest as a Constitutional 
Concept’ (Asser Press -Springer, The Hague 2016) 200. On the relevance of the concept 
of SGEI in state aid cases, see also Erika Szyszczak,’Altmark Assessed’in Erika Szyszczak 
(ed.) Research Handbook on European State aid law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2011), 
248.  
18 See, for example, European Commission, ‘The new State Aid Package for SGEI’, 
available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/presentation_sgei_de_minimis_e
n.pdf, visited 5 September 2017.  
19 See Point of the 2011 SGEI Decision, above note n 5, according to which ‘… It is 
clear from the case-law that, in the absence of sectoral Union rules governing the matter, 
Member States have a wide margin of discretion in the definition of services that could 
be classified as being services of general economic interest. Thus the Commission’s task 
is to ensure that there is no manifest error as regards the definition of services of general 
economic interest’. 
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advantage to the beneficiary. In the seminal Altmark judgment20 the Court 
of Justice of the EU (hereinafter CJEU) has developed a four-limb test to 
establish whether the compensation paid to the supplier of a public service 
is an economic advantage under Article 107(1) TFEU.21 A national 
measure that meets all the four cumulative conditions required by the 
Altmark test does not constitute a State aid and need not to be notified to 
the Commission. 
2.2. THE RELEVANT STATE AID SGEI RULES FOR PSO COMPENSATION 
TO AIRPORTS  
Where an airport public service compensation failed the Altmark 
test, thereby falling within the reach of Article 107(1) TFEU, it can 
nevertheless be found to be compatible with the internal market if it  
satisfies the criteria laid down by the State aid rules for SGEI. The criteria 
set by the 2011 SGEI Decision and the SGEI Framework are of particular 
relevance for the purpose of this article.  
The 2011 SGEI Decision is a hard law instrument, being binding in 
its entirety22. It applied to public service compensation schemes meeting 
some quantitative and qualitative criteria23.  As far as the aviation sector is 
concerned, the 2011 SGEI Decision applies to smaller airports with an 
average annual traffic not exceeding 200,000 passengers over the duration 
of the SGEI entrustment period24. Public service compensation granted 
to such airports is exempt from the obligation of prior notification to the 
Commission under Article 108(3) TFEU and can be cleared if it fulfils the 
compatibility conditions laid down by the 2011 SGEI Decision25. In 
practice, the 2011 SGEI Decision lays down a set of de minimis rules for 
public service compensation. More importantly, it provides for a safe 
                                                            
20 See above note n.14. 
21 The four conditions of the Altmark test are as follows: i) The recipient undertaking is 
actually required to discharge public service obligations and those obligations have been 
clearly defined; ii) The parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated 
have been established beforehand in an objective and transparent manner; iii) The 
compensation does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred 
in discharging the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and 
a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations; iv) Where the undertaking which is 
to discharge public service obligations is not chosen in a public procurement procedure, 
the level of compensation needed has been determined on the basis of an analysis of the 
costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means of 
transport so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have 
incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a 
reasonable profit for discharging the obligations. 
22 On the legal nature of decisions adopted by the European Commission, see Article 
288 TFEU. 
23 The criteria are laid down in Article 2 of the 2011 SGEI Directive.  
24 Article 2(e) of 2011 SGEI Decision, above note n. 5. 
25 Article 1 of 2011 SGEI Decision, above note n. 5. 
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harbour for the eligible airports whereby pubic authorities can award 
public service compensation to these airports without being subject to the 
Commission’s regulatory scrutiny.  
On the contrary, public service compensation for larger airports 
having more than  200,000 passengers per year falls outside the 2011 SGEI 
Decision and have to be assessed on the basis of the rules in the 2011 
SGEI Framework. Though not legally binding, the SGEI Framework is 
however of great practical relevance as it states how the Commission 
applies in practice the State aid rules for SGEI rules26. Unlike the 2011 
SGEI Decision, public service compensation under the SGEI Framework 
have to be notified to the Commission. The compatibility conditions laid 
down by the SGEI Framework also differ from those in the 2011 SGEI 
Decision in other aspects, thereby requiring a more thorough analysis27. 
The SGEI Framework stipulates that the responsibility for the provision 
of SGE must be entrusted to the undertaking concerned by way of one or 
more acts28. These acts have to specify the entrusted SGEI by indicating 
the following elements: a) the content and duration of the PSO; b) the 
undertaking and the territory concerned; c) the nature of any exclusive 
special rights awarded to the undertaking; d) the methods for calculating 
compensation; and  e) the arrangements for preventing and recovering any 
over-compensation29.  
The other basic compatibility conditions in the SGEI Framework 
are as follows: a) duration of the entrustment which should be set by 
reference to objective criteria30; b) the compensation amount must not 
exceed the net cost of discharging the PSO inclusive of a reasonable 
profit31; c) periodic overcompensation checks during the entrustment 
period and at the end of it32; and d) compliance with the Transparency 
Directive 2006/111/EC33.  
Additional compatibility conditions include: a) public consultation to 
weight interests of users and providers34; b) compliance with the EU 
public procurement rules35; c) no discrimination to determine 
                                                            
26 The Commission often relies on soft law instruments to clarify its approach to certain 
matters in the field of competition and state aid law. See, Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, 
‘EU Competition Law (5th Edition,OUP 2014), p. 118.    
27 Nicola Pesaresi, Adinda Sinnaeve, Valérie Guigue-Koeppen, Joachim Wiemann, 
Madalina Radulescu, above note n. 3. 
28 Point 15 of the SGEI Framework, above note n. 6. 
29 Point 16 of the SGEI Framework above note n. 6. 
30 Point 17 of the SGEI Framework, above note n. 6 . 
31 Point 21 of the SGEI Framework, above note n. 6 . 
32 Point 49 of the SGEI Framework, above note n. 6. 
33 Point 18 of the SGEI Framework, above note n. 6. 
34 Points 14 and 60 of the SGEI Framework, above note n. 6 . 
35 Point 19 of the SGEI Framework, above note n. 6. 
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compensation36; d) incentives for the efficient provision of SGEI37; e) 
careful assessment for serious competition distortions expected from 
compensation38.  
Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 of the article delves into the approach 
followed by the Commission to assess compliance of the national 
measures under scrutiny with the compatibility conditions to which the 
Commission appeared to have attached more weight in assessing whether 
the aid was lawfully granted to the airports of Kalmar, Sundsvall Timra 
and Skelleftea. In addition to the clear entrustment of SGEI, such 
compatibility conditions have been identified in those concerning the 
methods for the determination of compensation and avoiding 
overcompensation, compliance with EU public procurement rules. 
Section 5.4, instead, has a brief look at the other compatibility conditions 
considered in the State aid to Swedish airports cases. 
3. THE FACTS OF THE SWEDISH STATE AID AIRPORT CASES 
Before starting the analysis of the findings of the Commission in the 
Swedish airports State aid cases, it may be helpful having a quick look at 
the financial aid provided by the challenged national measures. In that 
regard, it can be said that the public aid measures in Kalmar Airport, 
Sundsvall Timra Airport and Skelleftea Airport are rather different from those 
considered in Västeras Airport.  
Kalmar Airport, Sundsvall Timra Airport, Skelleftea Airport all concerned 
financial arrangements put in place by the contracting authorities as a 
compensation for the  provisions of the SGEI entrusted to the beneficiary 
airports. The measures by which the Swedish authorities entrusted the 
SGEI to the airports of Kalmar, Sundsvall Timra and Skellftea, which will 
be referred to in this article as the Entrustment Acts, were similarly 
worded and imposed on airports similar duties and obligations39. The 
subject matter of the Entrustment Acts was to give the addressees the task 
to keep the airports open to commercial air links. Accordingly, the airports 
had to supply carriers with all the services that were necessary for the 
operation of commercial traffic. The Entrustment Acts provided for the 
compensation of the net costs incurred by the airport to discharge their 
public tasks. It also included an efficiency mechanism whereby the airport 
had to supply key indicators for the efficiency (KPI). If the KPI showed 
that the airport was less efficient than comparable Swedish airports, the 
airport had to give an acceptable explanation. When no explanation was 
                                                            
36 Point 20 of the SGEI Framework, above note n. 6. 
37 Point 39 of the SGEI Framework, above note n. 6. 
38 Points 51-59 of the SGEI Framework, above note n. 6. 
39 The terms of the Entrustment Acts are reported in the decisions of the Commission. 
See, in particular, Skelleftea Airport, above note n. 10, paras. 7-17; Sundsvall Timra Airport, 
above note n. 9, paras. 9-19; Kalmar Airport, above note n. 8, paras. 4-16. 
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given, the compensation must not exceed the net cost incurred  by the 
airport if it were as efficient as the comparison airports. 
As hinted before, the factual context in Västeras Airport was rather 
dissimilar as national authorities granted different types of public financial 
aid caught by the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU40. The Commission 
enquiry not only targeted the airport charges and the marketing incentives 
applied by the airport manager (VFAB) to Ryanair but also to the public 
financial sustain directly granted to VFAB. To cover the long-standing 
losses from which VFSB was suffering, the local public authorities crafted 
and implemented a package of financial aid. This package included 
contributions by public authorities to the equity capital of VFAB and 
operating support granted to VFAB under the Local Airport Scheme over 
the 2001-2010 period. To dispel the Commission’s concerns that aid 
granted to VFAB infringed Article 107(1) TFEU, Sweden argued that the 
majority of the activities of the Västeras Airport were not economic in 
nature. As the airport hosted flight schools and an aero club that did not 
perform economic activities, the airport services provided to those 
entities, so the argument run, did not have an economic nature41. Rather, 
the services supplied by the airport to them had to be qualified as SGEI. 
Hence, Sweden claimed that the financial aid given to VFAB had the 
nature of an SGEI compensation and did not constitute State aid.  
4. THE APPLICATION OF THE ALTMARK DOCTRINE 
All the aid measures considered in Kalmar Airport, Sundsvall Timra 
Airport, Skelleftea Airport and Västeras Airport failed the four-limb Altmark 
test because they did not satisfy the fourth condition. This condition, 
which is arguably the most problematic for national authorities to be met, 
comes into play when the firm on which the PSO is imposed is chosen 
outside a competitive tender procedure. To satisfy this condition, national 
authorities must show that the PSO compensation was determined on the 
basis of the analysis of the costs that a typical well-run undertaking would 
have incurred in the provision of the public service plus a reasonable 
profit.42 Yet, in Kalmar Airport, Sundsvall Timra Airport, Skelleftea Airport and 
Västeras Airport the Swedish authorities failed to correctly discharge this 
burden of proof. No analysis showing that the costs structure of the aided 
airport corresponded to that of an efficient comparable airport was 
provided. As a result, the Commission took the view that the 
                                                            
40 Vasteras Airport, above note n. 11, paras. 13-36. 
41 Vasteras Airport, above note n. 11, paras. 89-92. 
42 Vasteras Airport, above note n. 11, para. 109; Skelleftea Airport, above note n. 10, para. 
33; Sundsvall Timra Airport, above note n. 9, para.35. 
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compensation for the airports was not determined on the basis of the costs 
of an efficient firm.43 
The aid package reviewed in Västeras Airport also breached the first 
and second conditions of the Altmark test. It infringed the first Altmark 
condition because neither the entrustment act nor the by-laws of VFAB, 
clearly defined the PSO with which the airport was tasked. In the 
Commission’s view, the bylaws of the airport manager made no reference 
to the PSO imposed on the airport of Västeras but only contained a 
general description of the corporate object of VFAB.44 The second 
Altmark condition requires that the entrustment act sets out in advance in 
an objective and transparent manner the parameters for the calculation of 
the PSO compensation. Considering the lack of a clear act of entrustment 
of an SGEI to VFAB, the Commission concluded that there was no 
evidence of an ex ante definition of the PSO compensation but rather only 
of ex post compensation of unanticipated losses.45 This element was not 
sufficient to consider the national measures compliant with the second 
Altmark condition.  
5. THE APPLICATION OF THE STATE AID RULES FOR SGEI  
At this point the arguments submitted by the Swedish authorities 
employed in Västeras Airport diverged from those relied on in Kalmar 
Airport, Sundsvall Timra Airport, Skelleftea Airport. Though the Västeras 
Airport, with less than 200,00 annual passengers, was within the scope of 
application of the 2011 SGEI Decision, Sweden did not go on with the 
SGEI strategy but rather it relied on the provisions in the 2014 Aviation 
Guidelines. This change turned out to be successful as the Commission 
held that the financial support granted to the airport satisfied the 
compatibility conditions for operating aid.46 On the contrary, in Kalmar 
Airport, Sundsvall Timra Airport and Skelleftea Airport Sweden still pursued 
the SGEI strategy. Because the annual passengers of the airports exceeded 
the 200,000 thresholds, whether the SGEI exception applied to them had 
to be assessed in accordance with the rules in the SGEI Framework. The 
article now focuses on how the Commission applied the rules in the SGEI 
Framework.  
                                                            
43 Kalmar Airport, above note n.8, paras. 24-32; Sundsvall Timra Airport, above note n. 9, 
paras. 27-38; Skelleftea Airport, above note n. 10, paras. 25-36; Västeras Airport, above note 
n. 11, para. 109. 
44 Västeras Airport, above note n. 11, para. 108. 
45 Västeras Airport, above note n. 11, para. 109. 
46 For the sake of completeness, the Commission ruled that also the financial measures 
in favour of the airport that had the nature of investment aid met the compatibility 
conditions for the investment aid in the 2005 Aviation Guidelines and were accordingly 
declared compatible with the internal market. 
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5.1. THE QUALIFICATION OF PUBLIC TASKS ENTRUSTED TO AIRPORTS AS 
SGEI 
Logically the first issue to be considered to ascertain whether a PSO 
compensation  awarded to airports does not breach EU law is whether 
such PSO constitute genuine SGEI. As said above, the clear entrustment 
of SGEI to the beneficiary airport is enlisted as compatibility conditions 
for aid by both the 2011 SGEI Decision and the SGEI Framework47. The 
2014 Guidelines provide for guidance on which factors and economic 
evidence can be relied on to demonstrate that the recipient is amongst the 
well justified cases in which the overall management of an airport can be 
considered as genuine SGEI.48 In that regard, national authorities have to 
consider whether, absent the aided airport, its catchment area would be in 
such a situation of isolation, taking also into account alternative modes of 
transport, to prejudice the economic and social development of this area.  
Applying these criteria, the Commission considered the public tasks 
entrusted to the airports of Kalmar, Sundsvall Timra Airport and 
Skelleftea Airport as being a genuine SGEI for the following reasons. 
First, the aided airports played a very important role in ensuring 
accessibility to their catchment areas from the main Swedish and EU 
destinations. Competing airports did not represent an acceptable 
alternative for passengers because they were at more than 100 km away 
from the aid recipient and a travelling distance of at least 90 minutes49 or 
because they lacked the necessary infrastructure for the operation of a 
sufficient level of commercial traffic.50 Moreover, the travelling distance 
from some parts of the catchment areas of the recipients could be even 
longer,51 especially during winter time due to rough weather conditions.52 
Neither the maritime and rail links to/from the catchment areas of the 
airports of Kalmar, Sundsvall Timra and Skelleftea were satisfactory nor 
                                                            
47 See above at section 2.2 of this article.   
48 Point 72 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines, above note n. 1. 
49 Kalmar Airport, above note n. 8, paras. 59-66; Skelleftea Airport, above note n. 10, paras. 
61-71; Sundsvall Timra Airport, above note n. 9, paras. 62-64. 
50 Sundsvall Timra Airport, above note n. 9, para. 63. 
51 In Kalmar Airport, above note n. 8, paras. 64-65, the Commission observed that the 
airports of Växjö and Ronneby, were at an approximately 3h travelling time from the 
island of Öland that was comprised within the catchment area of the airport of Kalmar. 
Therefore, especially for the inhabitants of the island of Öland it was impossible to fly 
out to Stockholm and return on the same day without an overnight stay at Växjö or 
Ronneby. These airports, then, could not ensure the needed connectivity between 
Stockholm and the catchment area of the airport of Kalmar, especially the island of 
Öland. 
52 Skelleftea Airport, above note n. 10, paras. 62 and 69; being the airport in the Far North 
of Sweden, close to the Article circle, travelling time may be significantly prolonged by 
severe winter weather conditions. 
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they could be seen as an effective alternative to flying.53 Therefore, the 
Commission considered that the lack of acceptable connections would 
harm the standard of living of the inhabitants and the business prospective 
of the firms in the catchment areas of the aided airports, thereby 
prejudicing the social and economic development of those areas.54   
The second reason on which the qualification of the airports of 
Kalmar, Sundsvall Timra and Skelleftea as SGEI was grounded was that 
the airports would cease operating without the SGEI compensation. All 
these airports were located in sparsely populated and remote areas, 
whereas the airports of Sundsvall Timra and Skelleftea were close to the 
arctic zone.55 The aided airports also implemented the Basic Airport 
concept, which is a management tool that can boost the efficient use of 
the airports’ resources. Notwithstanding that, the airports were unable to 
generate enough profit to cover their operating losses and without public 
support, in the form of an SGEI compensation, they were likely to exit 
the market.56      
After having established that the public authorities have correctly 
qualified the public tasks of the aided airports as SGEI, the Commission 
went on to assess whether the national measures under scrutiny also met 
the other compatibility conditions in the SGEI Framework.  
5.2. THE COMPATIBILITY CONDITIONS REGARDING COMPENSATION 
AND OVERCOMPENSATION 
The SGEI Framework requires an entrustment act to specify the 
PSO and the methods to determine compensation57. The Commission 
found that the Entrustment Acts were officially adopted by the 
contracting authorities and that such acts clearly indicated the content, the 
duration of the PSO, the firm upon which the PSO is imposed, the 
methods for calculating compensation and the arrangements for avoiding 
and recovering overcompensation. The compensation to be paid to the 
airports covered only the net costs of the SGEI, as calculated on the basis 
of the observed factual operating losses suffered by the airport over a 
given year. To prevent overcompensation, the Entrustments Acts 
correctly laid down that the profits generated by the non-commercial 
                                                            
53 Kalmar Airport, above note n. 8, para. 68; Skellfetea Airport, above note n. 10, para. 73; 
Sundsvall Timra Airport, above note n. 9, para. 65. 
54 Kalmar Airport, above note n. 8, para. 69; Skellfetea Airport, above note n. 10, para. 74; 
Sundsvall Timra Airport, above note n. 9, para. 66. 
55 Skellfetea Airport, above note n. 10, paras. 78-79; Sundsvall Timra Airport, above note n. 
9, paras. 69-71 
56 Skellfetea Airport, above note n. 10, paras. 79-81; Sundsvall Timra Airport, above note n. 
9, paras.71-73. 
57 See Section 2.8 of the 2011 SGEI Framework, above note n. 6.  
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activities outside the SGEI have to be used to reduce the SGEI 
compensation.58  
From the SGEI Framework it emerges that the Commission’s 
favourite approach to calculate the compensation for SGEI is the net 
avoided cost methodology59. However, the application of this 
methodology to the airports of Kalmar, Sundsvall Timra and Skelleftea 
was inappropriate. The net avoided cost methodology requires the 
determination of the costs and revenues of the provider of the SGEI in a 
hypothetical scenario where there are no SGEI. Since all the commercial 
activities of the airports outside the entrustment acts depended on the 
existence of the SGEI, a hypothetical scenario where only the non-SGEI 
activities are conducted could not be envisaged. For this reason, the 
Commission employed the alternative methodology of the cost allocation, 
according to which the net cost for SGEI corresponds to the difference 
between the costs and revenues for the provider of SGEI. Considering 
the reports delivered by the aided airports before the closing of each 
financial year, the compensation granted to them did not exceed the net 
costs of the SGEI. For the above reasons, the Commission concluded that 
the proper application of the net costs methodology based on the actually 
incurred costs prevented possible overcompensation.60 
5.3. THE COMPATIBILITY CONDITION OF COMPLIANCE WITH EU PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT RULES  
According to the SGEI Framework, the provider of the SGEI must 
be selected in accordance with the EU public procurement rules61. Prior 
to establishing that the Entrustments Acts complied with these rules, the 
Commission had to assess whether the objected national measures fell 
within the scope of the EU public procurement legislation. The 
Entrustment Acts were qualified as service concession contracts because 
the major source of revenues for airports was the SGEI compensation. 
Next, the Commission took the view that the mode for the provision of 
the entrusted SGEI chosen by the contracting authorities was the in-house 
model in the sense of the Teckal judgment.62 In Teckal the CJEU ruled that 
when the provider of public services is controlled by the public authorities 
to which the major part of its activities are directed it must be considered 
as an in-house service provider in relation to the controlling public 
                                                            
58 Skelleftea Airport, above note n. 10, paras. 85-90; Sundsvall Airport, above note n. 9, paras. 
77-81; Kalmar  Airport, above note n. 8, paras. 76-79. 
59 See, Point 24, and especially, Point 27 of the SGEI Framework, above note n. 6, which 
states that the Commission regards the net avoided cost methodology as the most 
accurate method for determining the cost of a PSO.   
60 Skelleftea Airport, above note n.10, paras. 117-119; Sundsvall Airport, above note n. 9, 
paras. 107-109; Kalmar Airport, above note n. 8, paras. 96-103. 
61 Section 2.6 of the 2011 SGEI Framework, above note n. 6. 
62 European Court of Justice, Case C-107/98, Teckal Srl v Comune di Viano and Azienda 
Gas-Acqua Consorziale (AGAC) di Reggio Emilia, [1999] I ECR 08121.  
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authorities. Hence, the provision of public service under the in-house 
model is outside the reach of the EU public procurement rules.  
That said, the Commission went on to apply these rules to the facts 
of the Swedish airports State aid cases. It observed that the managers of 
the aided airports were indirectly controlled by the contracting authorities 
and the main activity of the airport managers was to run the airports in the 
concession contracts concluded with the public authorities. The result of 
the qualification of the relationship between the contracting authorities 
and the airports as ‘in-house provision of services’ was that such 
relationship was outside the scope of the EU public procurement rules. 
Hence, the Commission concluded that the acts by which the beneficiary 
airports were entrusted with the SGEI were exempt from the EU public 
procurement rules. The important consequence of this finding was that 
the compatibility condition of compliance with EU public procurement 
rules could not apply to the aid received by the airports of Skelleftea, 
Sundsvall and Kalmar63. 
5.4. THE OTHER RELEVANT COMPATIBILITY CONDITIONS 
This section of the article briefly discusses the compatibility 
conditions that apparently played a minor or no role in the line of 
reasoning followed by the Commission in the Swedish airports State aid 
cases. 
The absence of discrimination compatibility condition requires that 
in cases in which the same SGEI were entrusted to several undertakings, 
the same methodology must be used to calculate the related compensation 
for all the suppliers of such services64. Because the management of the 
airports of  Kalmar, Sundsvall Timra and Skelleftea was assigned only to 
one undertaking, this principle was not applicable in the State aid to 
Swedish airports cases65. 
To meet the public consultation compatibility condition, Member 
States have to publish on the internet or by alternative appropriate means 
the pieces of information enlisted by the SGEI Framework66. The 
Commission considered that Sweden submitted a report with a socio-
economic cost estimate for the aided airports prepared before the 
                                                            
63 Skelleftea Airport, above note n. 10, paras. 101-106; Sundsvall Airport, above note n. 9, 
paras. 92-97; Kalmar Airport, above note n. 8, paras. 88-93. 
64 Point 20 of the SGEI Framework, above note n. 6. 
65 Skelleftea Airport, above note n. 10, para. 122; Sundsvall Airport, above note n. 9, para. 
112; Kalmar Airport, above note n.8, para. 110. 
66 According to Point 60 of the SGEI Framework, above note n. 6, these data are as 
follows: the results of the public consultation concerningthe interests of users and 
suppiers; (b) the content and duration of the public service obligations; (c) the 
undertaking and, where applicable, the territory concerned; (d) the amounts of aid 
granted to the undertaking on a yearly basis. 
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adoption of the SGEI entrustment acts67. Sweden also reported to the 
Commission that the airports of Kalmar, Sundsvall Timra and Skelleftea 
carried out frequent surveys on travel needs in the region and customer 
satisfaction. The results of these surveys would be published on the 
airports’ websites68. Lastly, Sweden informed that the public has access to 
all the relevant documents on the basis of the principle of public access to 
documents enshrined in the Swedish Constitution.69 Considering the 
submissions made by Sweden, the Commission reached the conclusion 
that the challenged national measures fulfilled the transparency 
compatibility condition. 
The Commission was also satisfied that the Entrustment Acts met 
the compatibility condition of efficiency incentives. Under the SGEI 
Framework this compatibility condition comes into relevance when 
appraising the criteria laid down by the contracting authorities for the 
determination of the compensation for the SGEI supplier70. The 
Commission considered that the efficiency mechanisms in the 
Entrustment Acts complied with the requirement in the SGEI framework 
to introduce incentives for the efficient provision of SGEI. More 
specifically, the Commission positively viewed the duty for the aided 
airports to submit an annual report on KPI, as well as the obligation of 
airports and national authorities to take action in case, the KPI show a 
decrease in efficiency. It also believed that the implementation of the 
‘Basic Airport’ concept was instrumental in achieving the required 
efficiency71.  
A further compatibility condition is that SGEI suppliers comply with 
Directive 2006/111/EC on the transparency of financial relations 
between Member States and public undertakings72. Though the SGEI in 
question were entrusted to the airport managers that were fully owned by 
the contracting authorities, the provisions of directive 206/111/EC, 
however, could not apply to the cases of Skelleftea Airport, Sundsvall Airport, 
and Kalmar Airport. Indeed, the airports did not meet the financial 
threshold triggering the application of the directive, which was a total net 
turnover of at least EUR 40 million over the financial years preceding the 
payment of the compensation for the provision of the SGEI73. 
                                                            
67 Skelleftea Airport, above note n. 10, paras. 107-108; Sundsvall Airport, above note n. 9, 
paras. 98-99; Kalmar Airport, above note n.8, paras. 94-95. 
68 Skelleftea Airport, above note n. 10, para. 123; Sundsvall Airport, above note n. 9, para. 
113; Kalmar Airport, above note n.8, para. 111. 
69 Skelleftea Airport, above note n. 10, para. 125; Sundsvall Airport, above note n. 9, para. 
114; Kalmar Airport, above note n.8, para. 113. 
70 SGEI Framework, above note n. 6, especially Points 39-43. 
71 Skelleftea Airport, above note n. 10, paras. 117-119; Sundsvall Airport, above note n. 9, 
paras. 113-115; Kalmar Airport, above note n.8, paras. 105-106. 
72 Point 18 of the 2011 SGEI Framework, above note n. 6. 
73 Skelleftea Airport, above note n. 10, paras. 91-96; Sundsvall Airport, above note n. 9, paras. 
88-91; Kalmar Airport, above note n. 8, paras. 84-87. 
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Lastly, the SGEI Framework also sets out the compatibility 
condition that the length of entrustment must be justified by reference to 
objective criteria74. The Entrustment Acts determined the duration of the 
entrustment period in 10 years. The Commission took the view that the 
10-year period is objectively justified as it refers to the 10-year maximum 
depreciation period chosen by the aided airports. Indeed, such a long 
period of time is appropriate for the depreciation of the many tangible 
assets that are normally used by an airport.75  
6. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS  
The examination of the Commission’s decision on the Swedish State 
aid airport cases has shown that reliance on the Altmark doctrine is frayed 
with difficulties. This legal argument was rejected in all the cases in which 
it was invoked because the national measures failed to satisfy the highly 
controversial fourth condition of the Altmark test. Similarly, public 
authorities intending to draft aid packages for airports in accordance with 
the Altmark doctrine, so to put these measures beyond the reach of Article 
107(1) TFEU, should be aware that that may not be the best available 
option. Difficulties in correctly fulfilling the fourth Altmark condition may 
result in breaching this criterion with the ensuing risk of a State aid enquiry 
being opened by the Commission. On the other hand, the SGEI strategy 
looks more promising, as reflected by the higher success rate with which 
this argument was invoked in the Swedish airports State aid cases. 
6.1. FINDING THAT PUBLIC TASKS OF BENEFICIARY AIRPORTS ARE 
GENUINE SGEI 
The first issue to be considered when the public authorities played 
the card of the SGEI strategy is to demonstrate that the aided airport is 
tasked with an SGEI. The Commission has crafted a two-limb test to 
establish whether a PSO imposed on airports constitute an SGEI. Under 
the test, it must be established that, absent the aided airport, its catchment 
area would be isolated; and that there is a market failure in the sense that, 
without public financial support to the airport, no market economy 
operator would be ready to take up the provision of the SGEI in question.  
The isolation criterion is assessed by the Commission with a 
counterfactual. The question is whether, in a scenario where the aided 
airport is absent, its catchment area is in such a situation of isolation to 
prejudice its economic and social development. In Kalmar Airport, Sundsvall 
Timra Airport and Skelleftea Airport the Commission established that, had 
the aided airport left the market, their catchment areas would be isolated 
due to the poor or no connections other than the air links ensured by the 
                                                            
74 Point 17 of the 2011 SGEI Framework, above note n. 6. 
75 Skelleftea Airport, above note n. 10, paras. 97-100; Sundsvall Airport, above note n. 9, 
paras. 82-87; Kalmar Airport, above note n. 8, paras. 81-83. 
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aid recipients76. From that the Commission reached the conclusion that 
the lack of connections would negatively affect persons and business in 
the catchment areas. And all that would harm the social and economic 
development of these areas. It can be said that it is the isolation of the 
catchment areas to be the key factor in the counterfactual. From the 
hypothetical scenario of isolation of the catchment areas, the Commission 
seemed to infer a deterioration of the welfare of individuals and businesses 
with the resulting prejudice of the local social and economic development. 
No discussion of the causality links between the condition of isolation of 
the catchment areas and the prejudice suffered by the social and economic 
development of those areas was, however, made by the Commission.  
Turning to the market failure requirement, what public authorities 
have to do to meet this condition was well illustrated in Sundsvall Timra 
Airport and Skelleftea Airport77. The Commission found that in these cases 
the concerned airports were unable to obtain a significant increase in 
revenues and, accordingly, to survive without continuous cost 
compensation because an increase in air traffic was unlikely due to the 
scarce population in their catchment areas. The efficiency measures 
implemented by the airports with the view of cutting costs where possible 
were not enough to cover the operating losses suffered by them in the 
provision of the SGEI. These cases then highlight the importance for 
public authorities to demonstrate that, due to structural conditions such 
as the geographical position or scarcely populated catchment areas, the 
aided airport has limited prospects to attract a significant passenger traffic. 
The implementation of efficiency measures, like the Basic Airport concept 
in these cases, may also help to convince the Commission about a market 
failure affecting the aided airports. Also in Kalmar Airport, the Swedish 
authorities contended that the airport was unable to function without 
sustainable financial support despite the adoption of the Basic Airport 
concept78. The Commission did not discuss these arguments, neither did 
it explicitly reject them. Thus, it can be argued that the Commission 
considered that the market failure condition was satisfied also in Kalmar 
Airport. 
In sum, the key factor here is the hypothetical isolation of the 
catchment area of aid recipients that occurs due to the lack of acceptable 
alternative domestic and international connections. This proof was 
reached in Kalmar Airport, Sundsvall Timra Airport and Skelleftea Airport 
where all the concerned airports were located in remote sparsely populated 
areas. Incidentally, the airports of Skelleftea and Sundsvall Timra were in 
an outermost region close to the Arctic Circle. It should also be observed 
that the airports of Kalmar, Sundsvall Timra and Skelleftea were all small 
regional airports with a limited air traffic, comprised between 200,000 and 
                                                            
76 See section 5.1 of the article. 
77 Ibidem. 
78 Kalmar Airport, above note n.8, paras. 52-53. 
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700,000 annual passengers, thereby falling under the “B” category of the 
2014 Guidelines classification79. A further element that the airports of 
Kalmar, Skelleftea and Sundsvall Timra had in common was that they were 
all suffering from operational losses notwithstanding the implementation 
of management tools aimed at improving the efficient use of airport 
resources. 
The take home lesson for public authorities is that the Commission 
appears ready to consider as SGEI airports that find themselves in a 
factual and geographical context similar of those of the airports of Kalmar, 
Skelleftea and Sundsvall Timra80. The above factors and circumstances 
should be taken into great consideration by public authorities. In order to 
successfully invoke the SGEI strategy to lawfully grant financial sustain to 
airports, public authorities should employ this legal argument only in 
relation to small regional airports serving scarcely inhabited areas. The acts 
entrusting the SGEI should also provide detailed reasons why the 
contracting authorities believe that, in the absence of the aided airport, its 
catchment area would be isolated and that, without public aid, the airport 
would leave the market. By the same token, the Commission will accept 
the SGEI strategy as defense in the context of State aid investigations if 
the public authorities can prove to the requisite standard that the aid 
airports constitute SGEI on the basis of the criteria of isolation and market 
failure. 
6.2. MEETING THE COMPATIBILITY CONDITIONS IN THE STATE AID 
RULES ON SGEI 
In addition to correctly qualifying the aided airports as genuine 
SGEI, contracting authorities also have to make sure that the related 
entrustment acts comply with the substantive and formal requirements 
included in the compatibility conditions laid down by the 2011 SGEI 
Decision and the SGEI Framework. The decisional practice developed by 
the Commission in the application of such conditions is a remainder for 
public authorities of the importance of carefully drafting the entrustment 
acts. Not only the national contracting authorities have to correctly define 
a genuine SGEI but they also have to draft the entrustment acts in such a 
manner to comply with the SGEI rules regarding the methodologies for 
the determination of compensation, the need to avoid overcompensation, 
compliance with the EU public procurement rules and the presence of 
                                                            
79 Points 89 and 118 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines, above note n. 1. 
80 Similar factors were found in relation to the public service compensation granted to 
the airport of Angouleme, that is the only other case in which the Commission accepted 
the SGEI strategy. In comparison with the Swedish airports, the airport of Angouleme 
was much smaller, falling within the category “A” of the 2014 Guidelines with a volume 
of air traffic lower than 200,000 passengers per year. See Angouleme Airport, above note n. 
12.   
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efficiency incentives. Several lessons can then be drawn from the 
Commission’s findings on these issues. 
First, to determine the compensation of the SGEI, the Commission 
may be willing to accept the alternative methodology based on cost 
allocation instead of the application of its favoured net avoided cost 
methodology where this approach is not appropriate. Second, the 
reimbursement to the airport of a reasonable profit is acceptable provided 
that the profit does not go beyond the margin determined in the SGEI 
Framework, which is the relevant swap rate plus a premium of 100 basis 
point81. Third, an acceptable length of the entrustment should be that 
corresponding to the maximum depreciation period applied by the aided 
airport. Fourth, a claw back provision imposing the obligation on airports 
to pay back the portion of compensation received in excess of the net cost 
of the SGEI was considered by the Commission as a suitable tool to 
combat overcompensation. Fifth, mechanisms, such as those framed by 
the Swedish authorities imposing efficiency targets and linking the 
calculation of compensation to the meeting of such targets, were found to 
be appropriate efficiency incentives for the purpose of the SGEI 
Framework. Sixth, the Commission drew a line of distinction between 
public aid granted for compensation of an SGEI, on one hand, and aid to 
promote certain economic activities or rescue aid awarded to ailing firms, 
on the other hand. The Commission also highlighted that these 
instruments pursue different policy goals and are subject to different legal 
regimes. Seventhly and finally, as required by point 73 of the 2014 
Guidelines82, for an activity entrusted to an airport to be qualified as an 
SGEI it must not cover the development of commercial air transport 
services. Consistently with this requirement, in Kalmar Airport, Sundsvall 
Timra Airport and Skelleftea Airport Sweden confirmed that car parks and 
services consisting in renting premises to restaurant and café services and 
other sales outlets did not receive any public support83.  
Having that said, it may be worth noting before concluding that also 
the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) has adopted guidelines on state 
aid to the aviation sector (the EFTA Aviation Guidelines), which are 
similar to the European Commission’s 2014 Aviation Guidelines84. The 
                                                            
81 Point 36 of the 2011 SGEI Framework, above note n. 6. 
82 Point 73 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines, above note n. 1, provides that ‘In the light 
of the specific requirements attached to public service obligations for air transport 
services and in view of the complete liberalisation of air transport markets, the 
Commission considers that the scope of public service obligations imposed on airports 
should not encompass the development of commercial air transport services’. 
83 Skelleftea Airport, above note n. 10, paras. 82-83; Sundsvall Airport, above note n. 9, paras. 
74-75; Kalmar Airport, above note n. 8, paras. 73-74. 
84 EFTA Surveillance Authority no. 216/14/COL of 28 May 2014, amending for the 96th 
time the procedural and substantive rules in the field of State aid by adopting new 
Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines [2016/2051],  available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
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EFTA Aviation Guidelines allow national authorities to qualify certain 
economic activities of airports as SGEI and provide compensation for 
discharging such services85 and give guidance on which factors to be 
considered to qualify airports as SGEI86. The ESA has also enacted a set 
of State aid rules for SGEI similar to the correspoinding EU rules by 
adopting the Framework for state aid in the form of public service 
compensation87 and a communication on SGEI compensation88. As of 
the time of writing, the ESA has not yet applied the EFTA SGEI rules in 
the aviation sector89. Bearing in mind the similarities between the EU and 
                                                            
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.318.01.0017.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:318
:TOC, visited 5 September 2017. 
85 EFTA Aviation Guidelines, above note n.68, Point 69.   
86 Similarly to Point 72 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines of the Commission, Point 72 of 
the EFTA Aviation Guidelines state that: ‘As far as airports are concerned, the Authority 
considers that it is possible for the overall management of an airport, in well-justified 
cases, to be considered an SGEI. In the light of the principles outlined in point 69, the 
Authority considers that this can only be the case if part of the area potentially served by 
the airport would, without the airport, be isolated from the rest of the EEA to an extent 
that would prejudice its social and economic development. Such an assessment should 
take due account of other modes of transport, and in particular of high-speed rail services 
or maritime links served by ferries. In such cases, public authorities may impose a public 
service obligation on an airport to ensure that the airport remains open to commercial 
traffic. The Authority notes that certain airports have an important role to play in terms 
of regional connectivity of isolated, remote or peripheral regions of the Union. Such a 
situation may, in particular, occur in respect of the outermost regions, as well as islands 
or other areas of the EEA. Subject to a case-by-case assessment and depending on the 
particular characteristics of each airport and the region which it serves, it may be justified 
to define SGEI obligations in those airports. 
87 Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---
Framework-for-state-aid-in-the-form-of-public-service-compensation.pdf, visited 5 
September 2017.  
88 Application of the state aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services 
of general economic interest, available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-
guidelines/Part-VI---Compensation-granted-for-the-provision-of-services-of-general-
economic-interest.pdf,  visited 5 September 2017 
89 The only State aid case so far determined by the ESA in which SGEI-related arguments 
have been submitted was Hurtigruten in the maritime sector (ESA decision no. 
070/17/COL of 29 March 2017 on Coastal Agreement on Hurtigruten Maritime Service 
2012-2019, available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/esa-docs/physical/Final-
decision-non-confidential-version---Formal-investigation---Alleged-unlawful-aid-in-
Coastal-Agreernent-for-Hurtigruten-Maritime-Services-2012-2.pdf,  visited 5 September 
2017). This case was about a pubic aid granted to a ferry operator for providing maritime 
links between the coastal town of Bergen and Kirkenes in Norway over the 2012-2019 
period under a coastal agreement concluded with the Norwegian public authorities. The 
ESA took the view that the PSO imposed on the aided ferry operator constituted genuine 
SGEI. The public financial support granted to the ferry operator was considered as a 
compensation for discharging such SGEI. Hence, the aid was cleared by the ESA.    
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the EFTA State aid rules for SGEI, it can be argued that should the ESA 
open a State aid enquiry into PSO compensation to airports, it might 
follow an approach similar to that of the European Commission to assess 
the legality of the objected national measures. 
